


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The Republic of Plato

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
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THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

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THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

The Republic of Plato is written in the form of a dialogue. The persons who take part in the conversations are Socrates, Cephalus, Polemarchus the son of Cephalus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, brothers of Plato, and Thrasymachus.

Socrates and Glaucon, having gone down to the Piraeus to attend the festival in honor of the Thracian goddess Bendis, fall in with Polemarchus, Adeimantus, Niceratus, and some other friends, who persuade them to proceed to the house of Cephalus. There a conversation upon the subject of old age, its faults and trials, carried on between Cephalus and Socrates, finally introduces the question, What is Justice? At this Cephalus retires, leaving Polemarchus and Socrates to continue the discussion.

Polemarchus begins by propounding a definition of justice given by Simonides, who makes it consist in restoring to everybody what is due to him. The question, then, is what did Simonides mean by the term "due?" Apparently he meant little more than "appropriate"; for, according to him, the nature of the debt depends upon the nature of the relation existing between the two parties; so that, in reality, he makes justice consist in doing good to our friends, and harm to our enemies.

Socrates then asks Polemarchus to define the terms "friends"; and when the latter replies

that our friends are those whom we regard as good and honest men, Socrates shows that, as we are constantly liable to misjudge the characters of people, we must maintain either that it is just to injure the good, which is an immoral doctrine; or else that it is occasionally just to injure our friends, which directly contradicts the doctrine of Simonides. To escape from this dilemma Polemarchus shifts his ground, and states the theory of Simonides thus: It is just to help our friends if they are good men, and to injure our enemies if they are bad men.

The conversation proceeds:

Socrates: Must we restore to our enemies whatever happens to be due to them?

Polemarchus: Yes, no doubt—what is due to them; and the debt of enemy to enemy is, I imagine, harm; because harm is at the same time appropriate to such a relation.

Socrates: So then it would seem that Simonides, after the manner of poets, employed a riddle to describe the nature of justice; for apparently he thought that justice consisted in rendering to each man that which is appropriate to him, which he called his due. But here let me entreat you to give me your opinion. Suppose that consequently some one had asked him the following question: "That being the case, Simonides, what due and appropriate thing is rendered by the art called medicine, and what are the recipients?" What answer do you think he would have returned us?

Polemarchus: Obviously he would have said that bodies are the recipient, and drugs, meats, and drinks the things rendered.

Socrates: And what due and appropriate thing is rendered by the art called cookery, and what are the recipients?

Polemarchus: Seasoning is the thing rendered; dishes are the recipients.

Socrates: Good; then what is the thing rendered by the art that we are to call justice, and who are the recipients?

Polemarchus: If we are to be at all guided by our previous statements, Socrates, assistance and harm are the things rendered, friends and enemies the recipients.

Socrates: Then, by justice, Simonides means doing good to our friends, and harm to our enemies, does he?

Polemarchus: I think so.

In reply to this, Socrates, arguing from analogy, shows that to injure a man is tantamount to making him less virtuous, and therefore less just. But how can a just man, by the exercise of his justice, render the character of another less just than it was? The idea is preposterous. Therefore, the definition of Simonides, as amended by Polemarchus, is again proved to be incorrect.

Socrates: Now is it the act of a just man to hurt anybody?

Polemarchus: Certainly it is; that is to say, it is his duty to hurt those who are both wicked, and enemies of his.

Socrates: Are horses made better, or worse, by being hurt?

Polemarchus: Worse.

Socrates: Worse with reference to the excellence of dogs, or that of horses?

Polemarchus: That of horses.

Socrates: Are dogs in the same way made worse by being hurt, with reference to the excellence of dogs, and not of horses?

Polemarchus: Unquestionably they are.

Socrates: And must we not, on the same principle, assert, my friend, that men, by being hurt, are lowered in the scale of human excellence?

Polemarchus: Indeed we must.

Socrates: But is not justice a human excellence?

Polemarchus: Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates: And therefore, my friend, those men who are hurt must needs be rendered less just.

Polemarchus: So it would seem.

Socrates: Can musicians, by the art of music, make men unmusical?

Polemarchus: They cannot.

Socrates: Can riding-masters, by the art of riding, make men bad riders?

Polemarchus: No.

Socrates: But if so, can the just by justice make men unjust? In short, can the good by goodness make men bad?

Polemarchus: No, it is impossible.

Socrates: True; for, if I am not mistaken, it is the property, not of warmth, but of its opposite, to make things cold.

Polemarchus: Yes.

Socrates: And it is the property, not of drought, but of its opposite, to make things wet.

Polemarchus: Certainly.

Socrates: Then it is the property, not of good, but of its opposite, to hurt.

Polemarchus: Apparently it is.

Socrates: Well, is the just man good?

Polemarchus: Certainly he is.

Socrates: Then, Polemarchus, it is the property, not of the just man, but of his opposite, the unjust man, to hurt either friend or any creature.

Polemarchus: You seem to me to be perfectly right, Socrates.

Socrates: Hence, if anyone asserts that it is just to render to every man his due, and if he understands by this that what is due on the part of the just man is injury to his enemies and assistance to his friends, the assertion is that of an unwise man. For the doctrine is untrue; because we have discovered that, in no instance, is it just to injure anybody.

Hereupon Thrasymachus thrusts himself into the discussion, and, after some hesitation, defines justice as "the interest of the stronger." He supports his definition by the following argument: In every state it is considered unjust to violate the laws; the laws are framed to serve the interests of the government; and the government is stronger than its subjects; therefore, universally, justice is in the interest of the stronger, or might is right.

But, urges Socrates, a government becomes tyrannical; its laws become oppressive to the masses; and, according to the views of Thrasymachus, justice would require the subject in every instance to obey the laws of the ruling class.

To avoid this conclusion, Thrasymachus

argues that a ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, cannot be said to do wrong; therefore justice always commands the subject to be loyal to the rulers.

Socrates, in reply, demonstrates that every art, and therefore, among others, the art of government, should consult the interests, not of the artist or superior, but of the subject and inferior.

Thrasymachus then turns the discourse by declaring that a ruler treats his subjects just like the shepherd who fattens his flock for his own private advantage; and that justice, practiced by the ruling class, becomes the most lucrative course that it can adopt.

Socrates contradicts the assertion that the shepherd should fatten his flock only for his own private benefit; the shepherd, in so far as he is a shepherd, should simply consider the good of his sheep. Further, why should a ruler expect to be paid for his work, except on the supposition that the benefits of his rulership accrue, not to himself, but to the community? Indeed, strictly speaking, says Socrates, every artist is really remunerated, not by money only, but by what he terms "the art of wages." He then proceeds to show that injustice in any form tends to produce strife and diversion, while justice alone induces harmony and concord; that injustice always destroys all capacity for co-operative action in both states and individuals, and therefore is an element of weakness, and not of strength.

Finally Socrates endeavors to show that the soul, like the eye, and the ear, and every other thing, has a work or function to perform, and possesses a virtue by which alone it can be enabled to perform that work. This virtue

of the soul is justice; and without justice the work of the soul of man cannot be performed; and the soul itself cannot progress or be happy. Hence only the just man is happy, while the unjust is miserable; therefore only justice is profitable; so Socrates asks:

Are the rulers infallible in each several city, or are they liable to make a few mistakes?

Thrasymachus: No doubt they are liable to make mistakes.

Socrates: And therefore, when they undertake to frame laws, is their work sometimes rightly, and sometimes wrongly done?

Thrasymachus: I should suppose so.

Socrates: Do "rightly" and "wrongly" mean, respectively, legislation for, and against their own interests? or how do you state it?

Thrasymachus: Just as you do.

Socrates: And do you maintain that whatever has been enacted by the rulers must be obeyed by their subjects, and that this is justice?

Thrasymachus: Unquestionably I do.

Socrates: Then, according to your argument, it is not only just to do what makes for the interest of the stronger, but also to do what runs counter to his interest—in other words, the opposite of the former.

Thrasymachus: What are you saying?

Socrates: What you say, I believe. But let us examine the point more thoroughly. Has it not been admitted that, when the rulers enjoin certain acts upon their subjects, they are sometimes thoroughly mistaken as to what is best for themselves; and that, whatever is

enjoyed by them, it is just for their subjects to obey?

Socrates, having obtained the admission that the virtue of the soul must be justice, continues:

Come, then, consider this point next: Has the soul any function which could not be executed by means of anything else whatsoever? For example, could we in justice assign superintendence and government, deliberation and the like, to anything but the soul, or should we pronounce them to be peculiar to it?

Thrasymachus: We could ascribe them to nothing else.

Socrates: Again, shall we declare life to be a function of the soul?

Thrasymachus: Decidedly.

Socrates: Do we not also maintain that the soul has a virtue?

Thrasymachus: We do.

Socrates: Then can it ever so happen, Thrasymachus, that the soul will perform its functions well when destitute of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?

Thrasymachus: Impossible.

Socrates: Then a bad soul must needs exercise authority and superintendence ill, and a good soul must do all these things well.

Thrasymachus: Unquestionably.

Socrates: Now did we not grant that justice was a virtue of the soul, and injustice a vice?

Thrasymachus: We did.

Socrates: Consequently the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man ill?

Thrasymachus: Apparently, according to your argument.

Socrates: And you will allow that he who lives well is blessed and happy, and that he who lives otherwise is the reverse.

Thrasymachus: Unquestionably.

Socrates: Consequently the just man is happy and the unjust man miserable.

Thrasymachus: Let us suppose them to be so.

Socrates: But surely it is not misery, but happiness, that is advantageous.

Thrasymachus: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: Never, then, my excellent Thrasymachus, is injustice more advantageous than justice.

In the second Book of the Republic of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus resume the place which Thrasymachus has resigned. They would gladly believe that a just life is really preferable to an unjust life; but they cannot help thinking that too much stress has been laid by the eulogists of justice upon its accidental advantages, to the neglect of its intrinsic qualities. Would not a person be quite ready to commit injustice, if he could be sure of never suffering from the injustice of other men? Is not justice a kind of compromise, brought about by the necessities of social life? Do the poets ever praise it in, and for, itself? And, assuming the existence of the gods, how do they regard the just and the unjust man? May not the sins of the latter be expiated by sacrifice; and, in that case, will he not be as happy as the just man in the next world, and is he not much happier than the just in the present life?

Socrates acknowledges the difficulty of the question, and proposes to examine the nature of justice and injustice in a wider field, and on a larger scale. May not justice be applied to a state of society, as well as to an individual? And, if so, will it not be more fully developed, and therefore more intelligible, and more conducive to universal happiness, in the state than in the individual? He proposes to trace the rise of the state; to ascertain upon what manner of foundation it is built and in that way disclose the workings of justice and injustice.

Man, isolated from his fellowmen, is not self-sufficient. Hence the origin of society, and of the state, which requires the superintendence of a number of officials, who establish the first elements of a division of labor, which becomes more complex as the members of the community increase. Thus the society comprises at first only tillers of the soil, builders, clothing makers, shoemakers. To these are soon added carpenters, smiths, shepherds, etc. Gradually a foreign trade arises, which necessitates increased production at home, in order to pay for the imported goods. Production carried on upon so large a scale will call into existence a class of distributors, shops, and a currency. Thus there grows up in the state merchants, sailors, shop-keepers, and a laboring class, that does the productive work, but receives but a small portion of the result of its labor.

A state, thus constituted, will be well supplied with the necessities of life, if its members do not multiply too rapidly for its resources.

(This, of course, refers to a period when hand-labor was entirely relied on.)

If the state, finally, is to be supplied with luxuries, as well as with the necessities of life, it must contain cooks, confectioners, barbers, actors, dancers, poets, teachers, physicians, etc. It will also require a larger territory, which involves it in war with other states; and war calls into existence trained soldiers. This brings about a standing army, or a class that may be called Guardians.

How are these Guardians to be selected, and what qualities must they possess? They must be strong and fearless. How should they be educated? We must be very scrupulous about the substance of the stories which they are taught in childhood. Children, with rare exceptions, believe through life whatever is told them in their younger years. Nothing derogatory to the dignity of, or denial of faith in the gods must be allowed.

"Take into consideration," said Adelmantus, addressing Socrates, "another and a different mode of speaking with regard to justice and injustice, which we meet with both in common life and in the poets. All as with one mouth proclaim that to be temperate and just is an admirable thing certainly, but at the same time a hard and an irksome one; while intemperance and injustice are pleasant things and of easy acquisition, and only rendered base by law and public opinion. But they say that honesty is in general less profitable than dishonesty, and they do not hesitate to call wicked men happy, and to honor them both in public and in private, when they are rich or possess other sources of power, and on the other hand to treat with dishonor and contempt those who are in any way feeble or poor, even while they admit that the latter are better men than the former. But of all their statements the most

wonderful are those which relate to the gods and to virtue; according to which even the gods allot to many good men a calamitous and an evil life, and to men of the opposite character an opposite portion. And there are quacks and soothsayers who flock to the rich man's door, and try to persuade him that they have a power at command, which they procure from heaven, and which enables them, by sacrifices and incantations, to make amends for any crime committed either by the individual himself or by his ancestors; and that, should he desire to do a mischief to any one, it may be done at a trifling expense, whether the object of his hostility be a just or an unjust man; for they profess that by certain invocations and spells they can prevail upon the gods to do their bidding. And in support of all these assertions they produce the evidence of poets; some, to exhibit the facilities of vice, quoting the words (from Hesiod)—

“Whoso wickedness seeks, may even in masses obtain it

Easily. Smooth is the way, and short, for nigh is her dwelling.

Virtue, Heaven has ordained, shall be reached by the sweat of the forehead,”

and by a long and up-hill road; while others, to prove that the gods may be turned from their purpose by men, adduce the testimony of Homer, who has said:

“Yea, even the gods do yield to entreaty;
Therefore to them men offer both victims
and meek supplications,

Incense and melting fat, and turn them from anger to mercy;

Sending up sorrowful prayers, when trespass and sin is committed.”

And they produce a host of books, written by Musaeus and Orpheus, children, as they say, of Selene and of the Muses, which forms their ritual—persuading not individuals only, but whole cities also, that men may be absolved and purified from crimes, both while they are still alive and even after their decease, by means of certain sacrifices and pleasurable amusements which they call Mysteries; which deliver us from the torments of the other world, while the neglect of them is punished by an awful doom.

When views like these, he continued, my dear Socrates, are proclaimed and repeated with so much variety, concerning the honors in which virtue and vice are respectively held by gods and men, what can we suppose is the effect produced on the minds of all those young men of good natural parts who are able, after skimming like birds, as it were, over all that they hear, to draw conclusions from it, respecting the character which a man might possess, and the path in which he must walk, in order to live the best possible life? In all probability a young man would say to himself in the words of Pindar, "Shall I by justice or by crooked wiles climb to a loftier stronghold, and, having thus fenced myself about, live my life? For common opinion declares that to be just without being also thought just, is no advantage to me, but only entails manifest trouble and loss; whereas if I am unjust and get myself a name for justice, an unspeakably happy life is promised me. Very well then; since the outward semblance, as the wise inform me, overpowers the inward reality, and is the sovereign dispenser of felicity, to this I must of course wholly devote myself; I must draw round about me a picture

of virtue to serve as a frontage and exterior, but behind me I must trail the fox * * * For if we are just, we shall, it is true, escape punishment at the hands of the gods, but we renounce the profits which accrue from injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall not only make these gains, but also by putting up prayers when we transgress and sin, we shall prevail upon the gods to let us go unscathed."*

In answer to the words of Adeimantus Socrates replies:

There is something truly god-like in the state of your minds, if you are not convinced that injustice is better than justice, when you can plead its cause so well. I do believe that you really are not convinced of it. But I infer it from your general character; for judging merely from your statements I should have distrusted you; but the more I place confidence in you, the more I am perplexed how to deal with the case; for though I do not know how I am to render assistance, having learnt how unequal I am to the task from your rejection of my answer to Thrasymachus, wherein I imagined that I had demonstrated that justice is better than injustice; yet, on the other hand, I dare not refuse my assistance; because I am afraid that it might be positively sinful in me, when I hear Justice evil spoken of in my presence, to lose heart and desert her, so long as breath and utterance are left in me. My best plan, therefore, is to succor her in such fashion as I can.

At this Glaucon, together with the others, requested Socrates to investigate the real n

*(The book containing this passage is lost. It does not appear in any of Pindar's extant works.)

ture of justice and injustice, as applied to both the individual and the state, and in answer to this request a conversation takes place between Socrates and Adeimantus.

Socrates: We speak of justice as residing in an individual mind, and as residing also in an entire city, do we not?

Adeimantus: Certainly we do.

Socrates: Well, a city is larger than one man.

Adeimantus: It is.

Socrates: Perhaps, then, justice may exist in larger proportions in the greater subject, and thus be easier to discover; so, if you please, let us first investigate its character in cities; afterwards let us apply the same inquiry to the individual, looking for the counterpart of the greater as it exists in the form of the less.

Adeimantus: Indeed, I think your plan is a good one.

Socrates: If then we are to trace in thought the gradual formation of a city, should we also see the growth of its justice or of its injustice?

Adeimantus: Perhaps we should.

Socrates: Then, if this were done, might we not hope to see more easily the object of our search?

Adeimantus: Yes, much more easily.

Socrates: Is it your advice, then, that we should attempt to carry out our plan? It is no trifling task, I imagine; therefore consider it well.

Adeimantus: We have considered it; yes, do so by all means.

With this, Socrates proceeds: The formation of a city is due, as I imagine, to this fact, that we are not individually independent, but have many wants. Or would you assign any other cause for the founding of cities?

Adeimantus: No, I agree with you.

Socrates: Thus it is, then, that owing to our many wants, and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his various requirements, we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city. Is it so?

Adeimantus: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: And every one who gives or takes in exchange, whatever it be that he exchanges, does so from a belief that he is consulting his own interest.

Adeimantus: Certainly.

Socrates: Now then, let us construct our imaginary city from the beginning. It will owe its construction, it appears, to our natural wants.

Adeimantus: Unquestionably.

Socrates: Well, but the first and most pressing of all wants is that of sustenance to enable us to exist as living creatures.

Adeimantus: Most decidedly.

Socrates: Our second want would be that of a house, and our third that of clothing and the like.

Adeimantus: True.

Socrates: Then let us know what will render our city adequate to the supply of so many things. Must we not begin with a husbandman for one, and a housebuilder, and besides these a weaver? Will these suffice, or

shall we add to them a shoemaker, and perhaps one or two more of the class of people who minister to our bodily wants?

Adeimantus: By all means.

Socrates: Then the smallest possible city will consist of four or five men.

Adeimantus: So we see.

Socrates: To proceed then; ought each of these to place his own work at the disposal of the community, so that the single husbandman, for example, shall provide food for four, spending four times the amount of time and labor upon the preparation of food, and sharing it with others; or must he be regardless of them, and produce for his own consumption alone the fourth part of this quantity of food, in a fourth part of the time, spending the other three parts, one in making his house, another in procuring himself clothes, and the third in providing himself with shoes, saving himself the trouble of sharing with others, and doing his own business by himself, and for himself?

Adeimantus: Well, Socrates, perhaps the former plan is the easier of the two.

Socrates: Really, it is not improbable; for I recollect, myself, after your answer, that, in the first place, no two persons are born exactly alike, but each differs from each in natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation, and another for another. Do you not think so?

Adeimantus: I do.

Socrates: Well; when is a man likely to succeed best? When he divides his exertions among many trades, or when he devotes himself exclusively to one?

Adeimantus: When he devotes himself to one.

Socrates: Again, it is also clear, I imagine, that if a person lets the right moment for any work go by, it never returns.

Adeimantus: It is quite clear.

Socrates: For the thing to be done does not choose, I imagine, to tarry the leisure of the doer, but the doer must be at the beck of the thing to be done, and not treat it as a secondary affair.

Adeimantus: He must.

Socrates: From these considerations it follows that all things will be produced in superior quantity and quality, and with greater ease, when each man works at a single occupation in accordance with his natural gifts, and at the right moment, without meddling with anything else.

Adeimantus: Unquestionably.

Socrates: More than four citizens, then, Adeimantus, are needed to provide the requisites which we named. For the husbandman, it appears, will not make his own plow, if it is to be a good one, nor his mattock, nor any of the other tools employed in agriculture. No more will the builder make the numerous tools which he also requires; and so of the weaver and the shoemaker.

Adeimantus: True.

Socrates: Then we shall have carpenters and smiths, and many other artisans of the kind, who will become members of our little state, and create a population.

Adeimantus: Certainly.

Socrates: Still it will not yet be very large, supposing we add neatherds and shepherds,

and the rest of that class, in order that the husbandmen may have oxen for plowing, and the house-builder, as well as the husbandmen, beasts of burden for draughts, and the weavers and shoemakers wool and leather.

Adeimantus: It will not be a small state, either, if it contains all these.

Socrates: Moreover, it is scarcely possible to plant the actual city in a place where it will have no need of imports.

Adeimantus: No, it is impossible.

Socrates: Then it will further require a new class of persons to bring from other cities all that it requires.

Adeimantus: It will.

Socrates: Well, but if the agent goes empty-handed, carrying with him none of the commodities in demand among those people from whom our state is to procure what it requires, he will also come empty-handed; will he not?

Adeimantus: I think so.

Socrates: Then it must produce at home not only enough for itself, but also articles of the right kind and quantity to accommodate those whose services it needs.

Adeimantus: It must.

Socrates: Then our city requires larger numbers both of husbandmen and other craftsmen.

Adeimantus: Yes, it does.

Socrates: Then we shall require merchants also.

Adeimantus: Certainly.

Socrates: And if the traffic is carried on by sea, there will be a further demand for a con-

siderable number of other persons skilled in the practice of navigation.

Adeimantus: A considerable number, undoubtedly.

Socrates: But now tell me; in the city itself how are they to exchange their several productions? For it was to promote this exchange, you know, that we formed the community, and so founded the state.

Adeimantus: Manifestly, by buying and selling.

Socrates: Then this will give rise to a market and a currency, for the sake of exchange.

Adeimantus: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: Suppose then that the husbandman, or one of the other craftsmen, should come with some of his produce into the market, at a time when none of those who wish to make an exchange with him are there, is he to leave his occupation and sit idle in the market-place?

Adeimantus: By no means; there are persons who, with an eye to this contingency, undertake the service required; and these in well regulated states are, generally speaking, persons of excessive physical weakness, who are of no use in other kinds of labor. Their business is to remain on the spot in the market, and give money for goods to those who want to sell, and goods for money to those who want to buy.

Socrates: This demand, then, causes a class of retail dealers to spring up in the city. For do we not give the name of retail dealers to those who station themselves in the market, to minister to buying and selling, applying the term merchants to those who go about from city to city?

Adeimantus: Exactly so.

Socrates: In addition to these, I imagine there is also another class of operatives, consisting of those whose mental qualifications do not recommend them as associates, but whose bodily strength is equal to hard labor; these, selling the use of their strength and calling the price of it hire, are thence named, I believe, hired laborers. Is it not so?

Adeimantus: Precisely.

Socrates: Then hired laborers also form, as it seems, a complementary portion of the state.

Adeimantus: I think so.

Socrates: Shall we say then, Adeimantus, that our city has at length grown to its full stature?

Adeimantus: Perhaps so.

WHERE SHALL WE FIND JUSTICE?

Socrates: Where then, I wonder, shall we find JUSTICE and INJUSTICE in it? With which of these elements that we have contemplated, has it simultaneously made its entrance?

Adeimantus: I have no notion, Socrates, unless perhaps it be discoverable somewhere in the mutual relations of these same persons.

Socrates: Well, perhaps you are right. We must investigate the matter, and not flinch from the task. Let us consider then, in the first place, what kind of life will be led by persons thus provided. I presume they will produce corn and wine, and clothes and shoes,

and build themselves houses; and in summer, no doubt, they will generally work without their coats and shoes, while in winter they will be suitably clothed and shod. And they will live, I suppose, on barley and wheat, baking cakes of the meal, and kneading loaves of the flour. And spreading these excellent cakes and loaves upon mats of straw or on clean leaves, and themselves reclining on rude beds of yew or maple-boughs, they will make merry, themselves and their children, drinking their wine, wearing garlands, and singing praises of the gods, enjoying one another's society, and not begetting children beyond their means, through a prudent fear of poverty or war.

Here Glaucon interrupted, remarking: Apparently you describe your men as feasting without anything to relish their bread.

Socrates: True, I had forgotten. Of course they will have something to relish their food; salt, no doubt, and olives and cheese, together with the country fare of boiled onions and cabbage. We shall also set before them a dessert, I imagine, of figs and peas and beans; and they may roast myrtle-berries and beech-nuts at the fire, taking wine with their fruit in moderation. And thus passing their days in tranquility and sound health they will, in all probability, live to an advanced age, and dying, bequeath to their children a life in which their own will be reproduced.

Upon this Glaucon exclaimed, Why Socrates, if you were founding a community of swine, this is just the style in which you would feed them up!

Socrates: How, then, would you have them live, Glaucon?

Glaucon: In a civilized manner. They ought to recline on couches, I should think, if they are not to have a hard life of it, and dine off tables, and have the usual dishes and desserts of a civilized dinner.

Socrates: Very good; I understand. Apparently we are considering the growth not of a city merely, but of a luxurious city. I dare say it is not a bad plan; for by this extension of our inquiry we shall perhaps discover how it is that justice and injustice take root in cities. Now it appears to me that the city which we have described is the genuine and, so to speak, healthy city. But if you wish us also to contemplate a city that is suffering from inflammation, there is nothing to hinder us. Some people will not be satisfied, it seems, with the fare or the mode of life which we have described, but must have, in addition, couches and tables and every other article of furniture, as well as viands, and fragrant oils, and perfumes, and courtesans, and confectionery; and all these in plentiful variety. Moreover, we must not limit ourselves now to essentials in those articles which we specified at first. I mean houses and clothes and shoes—but we must set painting and embroidery to work, and acquire gold and ivory, and all similar valuables. Must we not?

Glaucon: Yes.

Socrates: Then we shall have to enlarge our city, for our first or healthy city will not now be of sufficient size, but requires to be increased in bulk, and filled out with a multitude of callings, which do not exist in cities to satisfy any natural want; for example, the whole class of sportsmen, and all who practice imitative arts, including many who use

forms and colors, and many who use music, poets also, with those of whom the poet makes use, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, contractors; lastly, the manufacturers of all sorts of articles, and among others those which form part of a woman's dress. We shall similarly require more personal servants, shall we not? that is to say, tutors, wet-nurses, dry-nurses, tire-women, barbers, and cooks moreover and confectioners? Swineherds again are among the additions we shall require—a class of persons not to be found, because not wanted, in our former city, but needed among the rest in this. We shall also need great quantities of cattle, for those who may wish to eat them, shall we not?

Glaucou: Of course we shall.

Socrates: Then shall we not experience the need of medical men also, to a much greater extent under this than under the former regime?

Glaucou: Yes, indeed.

Socrates: The country, too, I presume, which was formerly adequate to the support of its inhabitants will be now too small, and adequate no longer.

Glaucou: Certainly.

Socrates: Then must we not go to war, and cut ourselves a slice of our neighbor's territory, if we are to have land enough both for pasture and tillage, while they will try to do the same to us, if they, like us, permit themselves to overstep the boundaries of natural human requirements, and plunge into the unbounded acquisition of wealth?

Glaucou: It must inevitably be so, Socrates.

Socrates: Then we will be often plunged into war, Glaucon, or how will it be?

Glaucon: As you say.

Then, declares Socrates, We have traced the origin of war to causes which are the most fruitful sources of whatever evils befall a state, either in its corporate capacity, or in its individual members.

In the third Book of the Republic of Plato the methods to be followed in the instruction of Guardians, or soldiers, is described. Truth, courage, and self-control must be inculcated by all the stories that are employed in their education. Also the form, in which the stories are conveyed, will greatly affect the nature of their influence. Poetry may be either purely imitative, as in the drama; or purely narrative, as in the dithyramb; or a compound of both, as in the epic. The same person cannot do, or imitate, a great number of things successfully. Hence, if the Guardians are to study imitation at all, they must only be allowed to imitate men of high social standing. The style in which such men speak and write is always conservative and severe; such, therefore, must be the style in which the Guardians are allowed to speak, and in which the poets who superintend their education must be compelled to write.

Strict regulations must be enforced with reference to songs and musical instruments. No soft or sympathetic music should be heard by the Guardians. Their diet must be simple and moderate, and therefore healthy.

The rulers of the state must be of the military class. The remainder of society are to be called Auxiliaries; and in order to convince the masses of the wisdom and justice

of this order of things, they must be told a story, to the effect that they were all originally fashioned in the bowels of the earth, their common mother; and that it pleased the gods to mix gold in the composition of some of them, silver in that of others, iron and copper in that of others. Those in whom gold are mixed are the "powers that be," ordained of the gods; those in whom silver is mixed are the political and religious Auxiliaries of the powers that be; those in whom iron and copper are mixed are the workers.

The Guardians are to live hardy, frugal lives, quartered in tents, not in houses, supported by taxing the public. Adeimantus objects to the severe life, saying it will be anything but a pleasurable one. Perhaps so, replies Socrates; but it is a necessary life.

Then, having traced the rise of a state from first to last, Socrates returns to the question, What is Justice? and in what part of the state are we to look for it. The state, if it has been rightly organized, must be perfectly good. If perfectly good, it must be wise, brave, temperate and just. Hence, regarding the virtue of the state as a given quantity, made up of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, if we can find three of these, we shall by that very process have discovered the nature of the fourth.

The wisdom of the state resides in the small class of Guardians and Magistrates. The courage of the state resides in the Auxiliaries, and consists essentially in ever maintaining a right estimate of what is, or is not, formidable. The sustenance of the state obviously resides in the husbandmen and craftsmen.

The essence of temperance is restraint. The

essence of political temperance lies in recognizing the right of the governing body to the allegiance and obedience of the governed. It does not reside in one particular class, like wisdom and courage, but is diffused throughout the entire state in the form of a common consent, or harmony, upon this subject. Thus the three virtues appear; where, then, is the fourth?

After eliminating wisdom, courage and temperance, there still remains a something which enables the other three to take root in the state, and preserves them intact therein. This something must be justice. It may be defined as that which teaches everybody to attend to his own business without meddling in that of other people—which fuses together the three classes in the state and keeps each in its proper place. Conversely, the essence of political injustice lies in a meddling, restless spirit pervading the three classes, and leading each to meddle with the offices, tools and duties of the other two.

We should examine, said Socrates, whether our object in constituting our guardians should be to secure to them the greatest possible amount of happiness, or whether our duty, as regards happiness, is to see if our state as a whole enjoys it, persuading or compelling these our auxiliaries and guardians to study only how to make themselves the best possible workmen at their occupation, and treating all the rest in like manner; and thus, while the whole city grows and becomes prosperously organized, permitting each class to partake of as much happiness as the nature of the case allows it.

To which Adeimantus replied: I think that what you say is quite right.

Socrates: I wonder whether you will think the proposition that is sister to the last satisfactory also.

Adeimantus: What may that be?

Socrates: Consider whether the other craftsmen are similarly injured and spoiled by these agencies.

Adeimantus: What agencies do you mean?

Socrates: Wealth and poverty.

Adeimantus: How so?

Socrates: Thus: Do you think that a potter after he has grown rich will care to attend to his trade any longer?

Adeimantus: Certainly not.

Socrates: But he will become more idle and careless than he was before?

Adeimantus: Yes, much more.

Socrates: Then does he not become a worse potter?

Adeimantus: Yes, a much worse potter, too.

Socrates: On the other hand, if he is prevented by poverty from providing himself with tools or any other requisite of his trade, he will produce inferior articles, and his sons or apprentices will not be taught their trade so well.

Adeimantus: Inevitably.

Socrates: Then both these conditions, riches and poverty, deteriorate the productions of the artisans, and the artisans themselves.

Adeimantus: So it appears.

Socrates: Then apparently we have found some other objects for the vigilance of our guardians, who must take every precaution that they may never evade their watch and steal into the city.

Adeimantus: What are these?

Socrates: Wealth and poverty; because the former produces luxury and idleness and innovation, and the latter meanness and bad workmanship as well as innovation.

Thus there can be no justice in a state in which one class of citizens have more than their normal needs require, and another class have less than their normal needs demand.

What is found in the state must be also found in the individual. For how could it enter the state, except through the individual members of the state? Hence we should expect to find in the individual man three principles, corresponding to the three classes of the state.

Two contradictory impulses, coexisting in the mind, cannot proceed from the same source. A thirsty man is often unwilling to drink. Hence there must be two principles within him—one prompting him, the other forbidding him to drink. The former proceeds from appetite or desire, the latter from reason. Hence we have at least two distinct elements in the soul—one rational, the other irrational, or appetitive. In the same way we find ourselves obliged to distinguish a third element, which is the seat of anger, spirit, resentment, and may be called the spirited, or passionate, or irascible element. When there is any division between the rational and the irrational principles, this third principle always arrays itself on the side of the former. Thus we have the rational, the spirited and the concupiscent element in the individual, corresponding to the Guardians, the Auxiliaries, and the productive class in the state. Hence, the individual is wise, in virtue of the wisdom of the rational

element; courageous, in virtue of the courage of the spirited element; temperate, when the rational element governs with the full consent of the other two; and, finally, just, when each of the three performs its own proper work, without meddling with that of the others.

Injustice, on the other hand, disturbs and confounds the functions of the three principles; and this destruction of their concord and harmony shows itself externally in a variety of criminal acts. Justice, then, is a kind of natural harmony, and healthy habit of mind; while injustice is a kind of unnatural discord and disease. And, if so, it is superfluous to inquire which of the two is the more profitable to the possessor.

COMMUNAL PROPERTY.

How can natural harmony, which can only accompany justice, be brought about? Not in a state where strife and enmity exist between wealth on one hand and poverty on the other. Natural harmony can only exist among friends, and, declares Socrates, "among friends everything is common property." This brought forth among other things the question of women.

Finally Adeimantus said:

We have an idea that you are lagging, and stealing a whole section, and that a very important one, out of the subject, in order to avoid handling it; and we suppose you fancied that we should not notice your passing it over with the very slight remark, that every one would see that the rule, "among friends every-

thing is common property," would apply to the women and children.

Socrates: Well, and was I not right, Adeimantus?

Adeimantus: Yes; but this word "right," like the rest, needs explanation. We must be told on what plan, among the many possible ones, this community of property is to be carried out. Do not therefore omit to tell us what plan you propose. For we have been long waiting in the expectation that you would specify the conditions under which children are to be begotten, and the manner of rearing them after they are born, and, in fact, you would give a complete description of the community of women and children intended by you; for we are of the opinion that the mode of carrying out this idea, according as it is right or wrong, will be a matter of great, or rather of vital importance, to a commonwealth. So, finding that you are taking in hand another form of government (that of communism in production and distribution), before you have satisfactorily settled these points, we have resolved not to let you go till you have discussed all these questions.

To this Socrates complies. The women, according to the idea of Socrates, are to be trained and educated as well as the men, in order to become useful citizens in the Republic. For women are just as capable as men. Like the man, woman displays marked ability for a variety of pursuits, the only difference being one of degree, not of kind, caused by the reason that woman is physically weaker than man.

Those women who show evidence of a turn for philosophy or war are to be associated with

the Guardians or Auxiliaries, are to share their duties, and become their wives. The connections, thus formed, are to be placed entirely under the control of the Magistrates, and the children are to be educated and cared for by the state. In this way the Guardians and Auxiliaries lose all sense of private property; they become conscious of a unity of interest among all classes.

Adeimantus, while admitting that in some ways such a society might prove desirable, asks Socrates to show whether, and to what extent, it could be made practicable. To this Socrates replies by telling Adeimantus that his purpose has been to outline an ideal commonwealth, in which there would be neither poverty or wealth, with the view of discovering the nature of justice. The possibility of realizing such a state in actual practice is a secondary consideration which does not affect the soundness of the method, or the actuality of the results. All that can be demanded of Socrates is to show how the imperfect conditions, as existing in society, may be most nearly brought into harmony with the ideal state.

To bring about this result, said Socrates, one fundamental change is necessary. The governing powers must be taken from rulers and politicians, and placed in the hands of true philosophers. The true philosopher is devotedly loyal to wisdom in all its branches. We must carefully distinguish between the genuine and the counterfeit lover of wisdom. The point of distinction lies in this, that the latter contents himself with the study of the variety of beautiful objects with which we are surrounded, while the former is never satisfied until he has penetrated to the essence of

Beauty in itself. The intellectual state of the former may be described as "opinion," while that of the latter is "knowledge," or "science." For we have two extremes; first, real existence, apprehended by science; and second, the negation of existence, or nonexistence, or ignorance. Intermediate between real existence and nonexistence stands phenomenal existence; and intermediate between science and ignorance stands opinion.

Opinion takes cognizance of phenomenal existence. Those who study real existence are lovers of wisdom, or philosophers; those who study phenomenal existence are lovers of opinion, not philosophers.

Glaucon asked: And whom do you call genuine philosophers?

Socrates: Those who love to see the truth.

Glaucon: In that you cannot be wrong; but will you explain what you mean?

Socrates: That would not be at all easy, with a different questioner; but you, I imagine, will make me the admission I require.

Glaucon: What is it?

Socrates: That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two distinct things.

Glaucon: Of course they are.

Socrates: Then since they are two, each of them taken separately is one.

Glaucon: That also is true.

Socrates: The same thing may be said likewise of justice and injustice, good and evil, and all general conceptions. Each of them in itself is one thing, but by the intermixture with actions and bodies and with one another, through which they are everywhere made visible, each appears to be many things. * * * Those who

love seeing and hearing, admire beautiful sounds and colors and forms, and all artistic products into which these enter, but the nature of beauty in itself their understanding is unable to behold and embrace are not philosophers. Those who are capable of reaching to the independent contemplation of abstract beauty, are true philosophers.

Thus, argues Socrates, we understand how to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit philosophers; and, obviously, the former should be made Guardians of a state. Those who understand beauty, also understand the highest ideals of humanity. Politicians who merely seek power know nothing of these ideals; and human society, alas, is governed by these politicians.

Socrates enumerates the characteristics of the true philosopher—the ones who should be selected to govern the ideal Republic. These characteristics are, (1) an eager desire for the knowledge of all real existence; (2) hatred of falsehood and love of truth; (3) contempt for the pleasures of the body; (4) indifference to money; (5) highmindedness and liberality; (6) justice and gentleness; (7) a quick apprehension, and a good memory; (8) a musical, regular, and harmonious disposition.

Adeimantus objects that, though he cannot deny the force of the arguments of Socrates, still, in practice, he finds that the students of philosophy generally become eccentric, and thereby socially useless.

That is very true, replied Socrates; but on whom are we to lay the blame of such a state of things? Not on philosophy, but on the degraded condition of the teachings and the politician of the day. For, under the present system of society, the genuine philosophic mind

is liable to be corrupted by a variety of adverse influences; and when those who might have proved genuine philosophers have been drawn away from the pursuit of philosophy, their place is supplied by brands of worthless and incompetent persons, who by their sophistry and absurdities bring philosophy into general disrepute. The few who continue steadfast in their allegiance to philosophy, resign politics in disgust, and are well content if they can escape the corrupting effect of contact with the world.

How can this evil be remedied? The state itself must regulate the study of philosophy, and must take care that the students pursue it on right principles, and at a right age. If a state is to be made a home for its citizens, it must be governed by philosophers. If such should ever take place (and why should it not?), the ideal state will be realized. As it is we are governed by mercenary adventurers, who teach nothing but the opinions of the multitude. As well might a person investigate the caprices and desires of some huge and powerful monster in his keeping, said Socrates, studying how it is to be approached, and how handled—at what times and under what circumstances it becomes most dangerous, or most gentle—on what occasions it is in the habit of uttering its various cries, and, further, what sounds uttered by another person soothe or exasperate it—and when he has mastered all these particulars, by long continued intercourse, as well he might call his results wisdom, systematize them into an art, and open a school, though in reality he is wholly ignorant which of those humors and desires is fair, and which foul, which good and which evil, which just and which unjust; and therefore is content to affix all these names to the fancies of the hu-

animal, calling what it likes good, and what it dislikes evil, without being able to render any other account of them—nay, giving the titles of “just” and “fair” to things done under compulsion, because he has not discerned himself, and therefore cannot point out to others, that wide distinction which really holds between the nature of the compulsory and the good. Tell me, in heaven’s name, asked Socrates of Adeimantus, do you not think that such a person would make a strange guide?

Adeimantus: Yes, I do think so.

Socrates: And do you think that there is any difference between such a person and the man who makes wisdom consist in having studied the whim and pleasures of the many-headed multitude, whether in painting, or in music, or finally in politics?

Then how shall we obtain just rulers? In youth and boyhood, said Socrates, they ought to be put through a course of training in philosophy, suited to their years; and while their bodies are growing up to manhood, especial attention should be paid to them, as a serviceable acquisition in the cause of philosophy. At the approach of that period, during which the mind begins to attain its maturity, the mental exercises ought to be rendered more severe. Finally, when their bodily powers begin to fail, and they are released from public duties and military service, from that time forward they ought to live a dedicated life, and consecrate themselves to this one pursuit, if they are to live happily on earth, and after death to crown the life they have led with a corresponding destiny in another world.

And what are the highest studies to be found? The highest of all is the study of “the Good,” whose possession is blindly desired by all men,

though they cannot give a clear account of its nature. Is it not plain, then, that the Guardians of the state must make a special study of this Good? For without it, how can they justly perform the duties of their office?

What is this Good, asks Adeimantus. Socrates admits that he cannot fully answer the question. He can only convey his conception of it by an analogy. In the world of sense we have the sun, the eye, visible objects; answering to which, we have in the intellectual world, the Good, Reason, the Forms or archetypes of visible objects, or, in the words of Socrates, Ideas. Or we may represent the same conception to ourselves, in this manner: There are two worlds—one visible, as seen by the eye; the other intellectual, as only perceived by the mind. Each world comprises two subdivisions, which, proceeding from the most uncertain to the certain, are, in the visible world. Images, i. e., shadows, reflections, etc.; Objects, i. e., all material things, whether animate or inanimate. In the intellectual world, Knowledge, attained by the aid of assumed premises on which all conclusions depend, and employing by way of illustration the second class of the visible world, e. g., Geometry; also Knowledge, in the investigation of which no material objects, but only the essential Forms are admitted, and in which hypotheses are used simply as a means of arriving at an absolute first principle, from which unerring conclusions may be deducted. Corresponding to these four classes, we have four mental states, which, again proceeding from the most uncertain, are, Conjecture, Belief, Understanding and Reason.

In the seventh book of the Republic Socrates, in order to understand the real import of such an education as he has outlined, offers as an illustration a number of persons chained from

their birth in a subterranean cavern, with their backs to the entrance of the cavern, and a fire burning behind them, between which and the prisoners runs a roadway, flanked by a wall high enough to conceal the persons who pass along the road, while it allows the shadows of things which they carry upon their heads to be thrown by the fire upon the wall of the cavern facing the prisoners, to whom these shadows will appear as the only realities. Now suppose that one of them has been unbound, and taken up to the light of day, and gradually habituated to the objects around him, till he has learned to really appreciate them. Such a man is to the unenlightened prisoners what an advanced philosopher is to the mass of backward, or half-educated, men and women. If he returns to the cavern, and resumes his former place and occupation, he will, at first, be the laughing stock of the others, just as the philosopher is the laughing stock, or is even hated, by the multitude. But once rehabilitated to the cavern, his knowledge of the objects which throw the shadows will enable him to advance beyond the prisoners who do not possess this knowledge. In the same manner the philosopher, when once habituated to intercourse with the world, will advance beyond the others in knowledge, justice and humanity. Therefore such should govern society.

Socrates, carrying the analogy still further, points that just as the whole body of the released prisoner was turned around in order to bring his eye to look in the right direction, so the purpose of education should be to turn the whole soul of man around, in order that the soul, or reason, may be directed rightly. Education does not generate or infuse a new principle; it only guides and directs a principle already in existence.

How is this revolution of the soul to be brought about? By the agency of such studies which tend to draw the mind from sensuous and selfish to the real and humane—from the visible and material to the invisible and eternal. Such studies as excite the mind to reflect upon the essential nature of the Universe will produce this result.

If Plato, the philosopher, were living today, how his soul would revolt at the false education of our schools, our press, and our pulpits!

In the eighth book of the Republic Socrates dwells upon the principal varieties of mental constitution and political organization. All conceivable politics may be reduced to five classes, represented by aristocracy, timocracy (a government of honor), oligarchy, democracy, and despotism. There are also five classes of human character, corresponding to the five classes of a state.

Everything that has had a beginning is subject to decay. Hence, in the course of time, diversions arise between the classes, and between the members of the classes themselves. The result is an understanding between the members of the higher classes, that they shall expropriate the wealth produced, and reduce the producers to slaves or serfs.

The lust of wealth grows till it transforms the state into an oligarchy, or the rulership of the rich. This lust, which pervades the governing body in an oligarchy, finally produces a dangerous class of poverty-stricken citizens, who appeal to arms and establish a democracy. Democracy in turn becomes reactionary, and prepares the way for despotism. The tyrannical man is the child of the democratical man—one in whom a single absorbing passion has

become predominant, and which absorbs all the lower appetites, pleasures and desires, and ministers to their gratification. Faithless, hypocritical, unjust, the tyrannical man becomes the ruling tyrant of the tyrannical state.

As state is to state in point of happiness or misery, so is man to man.

The soul of man contains three specific principles: The rational, or wisdom-loving, the spirited, or honor-loving, and the greedy, or gain-loving. There are three species of pleasures, corresponding to these three principles. The philosopher recognizes wisdom as the source of greatest pleasure; the ambitious man recognizes honor bestowed upon him; the sordid man recognizes money. Which of these three is right? Most obviously, says Socrates, the philosopher. The philosopher finds that wisdom, kindness and happiness are inseparable.

To everything there is a special vice by which, and by which alone, that thing can be destroyed. Thus, blindness destroys the eyesight, mildew destroys corn, and rot destroys timber. The vices that destroy the soul are injustice, intemperance, cowardice and ignorance.

Justice itself is the just man's best reward, and only a society founded on justice can find enduring happiness. Not only are love and honor the reward of the just man while he lives, but still greater rewards await him after he dies. To illustrate this Socrates narrates to Glaucon the fable of Er the son of Armenius:

THE FABLE OF THE ER.

I will tell you a tale, not like that of Odysseus to Alcinous, but of what once happened to a brave man, the son of Armenius, a native of Pamphylia, who, according to story, was killed

in battle. When the bodies of the slain were taken up ten days afterwards for burial in a state of decomposition, Er's body was found to be still fresh. He was carried home, and was on the point of being interred, when, on the twelfth day after his death, as he lay on the funeral-pyre, he came to life again, and then proceeded to describe what he had seen in the other world.

His story was, that when the soul had gone out of him, it traveled in company with many others till they came to a mysterious place, in which were two gaps, adjoining one another in the earth, and exactly opposite them two gaps above in the heaven. Between these gaps sat judges, who, after passing sentence, commanded the just to take the road to the right upwards through the heaven, and placed in front of them a symbol of the judgment that had been given; while the unjust were ordered to take the road downwards to the left, and also carried behind them evidence of all their evil deeds. When he came to the place himself, he was told that he would have to carry to men a report of the proceedings of that other world; and he was admonished to listen, and watch everything that went on there. So he looked, and beheld the souls on one side taking their departure at one of the gaps in the heaven and the corresponding gap in the earth, after judgment had been passed upon them; while at the other two gaps he saw them arriving, squalid and soiled, or pure and bright, according as they ascended from earth, or descended from heaven.

Each soul, as it arrived, wore a travel-stained appearance, and gladly went away into the meadow and there took up quarters, as people do when some great festival is pending. Greetings passed between all that were known to one another; and those who had descended

from heaven were questioned about heaven by those who had risen out of the earth; while the latter were questioned by the former about earth. Those who were come from earth told their tale with lamentations and tears, as they bethought them of all the dreadful things that they had seen and suffered in their subterranean journey, which they said had lasted a thousand years; while those who were come from heaven described enjoyments and sights of marvelous beauty. It would take a long time, Glaucon, to repeat at length the many particulars of their stories; but, according to Er, the main points were the following:

For everyone of all the crimes, and all the personal injuries committed by them, they suffered tenfold retribution. The cycle of punishment recommenced every hundred years, because the length of human life was estimated at a hundred years; the object being to make them pay the penalty for each offense ten times over. Thus, all who had been guilty of a number of murders, or who had betrayed and enslaved cities and armies, or who had been accomplices in any other villainy, were destined to undergo tenfold sufferings for all and each of their offenses; while, on the other hand, those who had done kindly acts, and had shown justice and righteousness, were destined to receive on the same principle their due reward. With regard to those whose death followed close upon their birth, he gave some particulars which need not be recorded. But, according to his narrative, the punishment for impiety, disobedience to parents, and the murder of near relatives, was unusually severe; and the reward for piety and obedience unusually great. For he was within hearing, he said, when one of the spirits asked where Ardiaëus the Great was.

Now this Ardiaeus had been sovereign in a city of Pamphylia, a thousand years before that time, and was said to have put his aged father and elder brother to death, besides committing other wicked deeds. The spirit to whom the question was addressed, replied.

"He is not come, and is not likely to come hither. For this, you must know, was one of the terrible sights that we beheld. When we were close to the aperture, and were on the point of ascending, after having undergone all our other sufferings, we suddenly came in sight of Ardiaeus and others, of whom the greater part had been despots; though it is true there were also a few private persons, who had once been enormous criminals. These people, when they thought themselves sure of ascending immediately, were repulsed by the aperture, which belled whenever one of these incurable sinners, or anybody who had not fully expiated his crimes, attempted to ascend. Thereupon certain fierce and fiery-looking men, who were in attendance and understood the meaning of the sound, seized some of them and carried them off; but Ardiaeus and others were bound hand and foot and head, and thrown down and flayed with scourges, and dragged out by the wayside, and, carded like wool upon thorn-brushes; and those who were passing by at the time were informed why they were put to this torture, and that they were being carried away in order to be flung into Tartarus. We had already gone through a great variety of alarms, but none of them were equal to the terror that then seized us, lest that bellowing should be uttered when any of us tried to go up; and most glad we all were to ascend, when it was not heard."

This will convey an idea of the penalties and the tortures; while the rewards were precisely the opposite.

When seven days had elapsed since the arrival of the spirits in the meadows, they were compelled to leave the place, and set out on the eighth day, and travel three days, till they arrived on the fourth at a place, from whence they looked down upon a straight pillar of light, stretching across the whole heaven and earth, more like the rainbow than anything else, only brighter and clearer. This they reached when they had gone forward a day's journey; and, arriving at the center of the light, they saw that its extremities were fastened by chains to the sky. For this light binds the sky together, like the hawser that strengthens a trireme, and thus holds together the whole revolving universe.* To the extremities is fastened the distaff of Necessity, by which all the revolutions of the universe are kept up. The shaft and hook of this distaff are made of steel; the whole is a compound of steel and other materials. The nature of the whorl may be thus described: In shape it is like an ordinary whorl; but from Er's account we must picture it to ourselves under the form of a large hollow whorl, scooped out right through, into which a similar but smaller whorl is nicely inserted, like boxes which fit into one another. In the same way a third whorl is inserted within the second, a fourth within the third, and so one to four more. For in all there are eight whorls inserted into one another, each concentric circle showing its rim above the next outer, and all together forming one solid whorl embracing the shaft, which is passed through the center of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the broadest rim; the sixth has the next broadest; then comes the fourth; then the eighth;

*In Greek astronomy, like that of the Bible, the sky was supposed to be a solid transparent vault in which the stars were fixed.

then the seventh; then the fifth; then the third; and the second has the narrowest rim.

The rim of the greatest whorl exhibits a variety of colors; that of the seventh is most brilliant; that of the eighth derives its colors from the reflected light of the seventh; that of the second and that of the fifth are similar, but of a deeper color than the others; the third has the palest color; the fourth is rather red; and the sixth is almost as pale as the third.

Now the distaff as a whole spins round with uniform velocity; but, while the whole revolves, the seven inner circles travel slowly round in the opposite direction, and of them the eighth moves quickest, and after it the seventh, sixth and fifth, which revolve together; the fourth, as it appeared to them, completes its revolution with a velocity inferior to the last mentioned; the third ranks fourth in speed; and the second fifth.*

The distaff spins round upon the knees of Necessity. Upon each of its circles stands a siren, who travels round with the circle, uttering one note in one tone; and from all the eight notes there results a single harmony. At equal distances around sit three other personages, each on a throne. These are the daughters of Necessity, the Fates—Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos; who, clothed in white robes, with gar-

**This is a description of the first observed phenomena of astronomy. The motion of the whole distaff represents the apparent diurnal revolution of the heaven around the earth as center of the system. The seven innermost whorls, with their independent motions, represent respectively the orbits of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, the Sun and the Moon. The outermost whorl with its "variety of colors," represents the fixed stars.*

lands on their heads, chant to the music of the sirens; Lachesis the events of the past; Clotho those of the present; Atropos those of the future.

Clotho with her right hand takes hold of the outermost rim of the distaff, and at intervals twirls it altogether; and Atropos with her left hand twirls the inner circles in like manner; while Lachesis takes hold of each in turn with either hand.

Now the souls, immediately on their arrival, were required to go to Lachesis. An Interpreter first of all marshalled them in order, and then having taken from the lap of Lachesis a number of lots and plans of life, mounted a high platform and spoke as follows:

"Thus saith the Maiden Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity: 'Ye short-lived souls, a new generation of men shall here begin the cycle of its mortal existence. Your destiny shall not be allotted to you, but you shall choose it for yourselves. Let him who draws the first lot be the first to choose a life, which shall be his irrevocably. Virtue owns no master; he who honors her shall have more of her, and he who slights her, less. The responsibility lies with the chooser. Heaven is guiltless.' "

Having thus spoken, he threw the lots down upon the souls, and each soul took up the one which fell by his side, except Er himself, who was forbidden to do so. Each, as he took up his lot, saw what number he had drawn. This done, the plans of life, which far outnumbered the souls that were present, were laid before them.

They were of every kind. There were lives of all living creatures, and among them every sort of human life. They included sovereignties, of which some were permanent, while others were

abruptly terminated and ended in poverty and exile. There were lives of famous men, renowned for beauty of person, for bodily strength, or for high birth and the merits of ancestors; and likewise there were lives of undistinguished men, of celebrated and uncelebrated women. But no settled character of soul was included in them, because with the change of life the soul also becomes changed. But in every other respect the materials were variously combined—wealth appearing here, and poverty there; disease here, and health there; and here again a mean between these extremes.

This, my dear Glaucon, is apparently the moment when everything is at stake with a man; and for this reason, above all others, it is the duty of each of us to diligently investigate and study, to the neglect of every other subject, that science which may haply enable a man to discover who will so instruct him that he will be able to discriminate between a good and evil life, and, according to his means, to choose, always and everywhere, that better life, by carefully calculating the influence of the things just told in combination or in separation, may have upon the real excellence of life; and who will teach him to understand what evil or good is wrought by beauty tempered with poverty or wealth, and how the result is affected by the state of soul which enters into the combination; and what is the consequence of blending together such ingredients as high or humble birth, private or public life, bodily strength or weakness, readiness or slowness of apprehension, and everything else of the kind, whether naturally belonging to the soul or accidentally acquired by it; so as to be able to form a judgment from all these data combined, and, with an eye steadily fixed on the nature of the soul, to choose between the good and the evil life,

giving the name of evil to the life which will draw the soul into becoming more unjust, and the name of good to the life which will lead it to become more just, and bidding farewell to every other consideration of life.

For we have seen that in life and in death it is best to choose thus. With iron resolution must he hold fast this opinion when he enters the future world, in order that there as well as here he may escape being dazzled by wealth and like evils; and may not plunge into usurpations or other similar courses of action, to the inevitable hurt of other people, and to his own still heavier hurt; but may know how to choose that life which always steers a middle course between extremes, and to shun excess, not only in this life, but also in that which is to come. For only by acting thus can he become a happy soul.

To return; the messenger from the other world reported that the Interpreter spoke to this effect:

"Even the last comer, if he chooses with discretion, and lives wisely, will find in store for him a life that is anything but unhappy, with which he may well be content. Let not the first choose carelessly, or the last despond."

As soon as he had said these words the one who had drawn the first lot advanced, and chose the most absolute despotism he could find; but so thoughtless was he, and so greedy, that he had not carefully examined every point before making his choice; so that he failed to note that he was fated therein, amongst other calamities, to devour his own children. Therefore, when he had studied it at leisure, he began to beat his breast and bewail his choice; and, disregarding the admonitions of the Interpreter, he laid the blame of his misfortune, not

upon himself for choosing the life of an oppressor of mankind, but upon Fortune and Destiny, and upon anybody save himself.

He was one of those who had come from heaven and had lived during his former life under well-ordered conditions, and hence a measure of virtue had fallen to his share through the influence of habit, unaided by any philosophy. Indeed, according to Er's account, more than half the souls similarly deluded,—i. e., greedy for earthly power—had come from heaven; which is to be explained by the fact of their never having been disciplined through experience. For the majority of those who came from earth did not make their choice in this careless manner, because they had known sorrow themselves, and had seen it in others.

If a man were always to carefully study wisdom, whenever he entered upon his career on earth, and if it fell to his lot to choose anywhere but among the very last, there is every reason, to judge by the account brought from the other world, that he would not only be happy while on earth, but also that he would travel from the world to the other and back again, not along a rough and subterranean, but along, a smooth and heavenly road.

It was a truly wonderful sight, he said, to watch how each soul selected its life; a sight at once melancholy, and ludicrous, and strange. The experience of their former life guided the choice. Thus he saw the soul, which had once been that of Orpheus, choosing the life of a swan, because from having been put to death by women he detested the whole race so much that he would not consent to be conceived and born of a woman. And he saw the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale.

He saw also the soul of a swan changing its nature, and selecting the life of a man; and its example was followed by other musical creatures.

The soul that drew the twentieth lot chose a lion's life; it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, who shrunk from becoming a man because he recollected the decision respecting the arms of Achilles. He was followed by the soul of Agamemnon, who had also been taught by his sufferings to hate mankind so bitterly that he adopted in exchange an eagle's life. The soul of Atalanta, which had drawn one of the middle lots, beholding the great honors attached to the life of an athlete, could not resist the temptation to become one. Then he saw the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus assuming the character of a skilful work-woman. And in the distance, among the last, he saw the soul of Thersites the buffoon choose the life of an ape.

It so happened that the soul of Odysseus had drawn the last lot of all. When he came to choose the memories of his former sufferings had so softened his ambition that he went about a long time looking for a quiet, retired life; which at last, with much trouble, he discovered lying about, and which had been contemptuously cast aside by the others. As soon as he found it he chose it gladly, and said that he would have done so even if he had drawn the first lot. And likewise some of the various animals passed into men, as well as into one another; the unjust passing into the wild, and the just into the tame; and every kind of mixture ensued.

Now, when all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they advanced in their turn to Lachesis, the daughter of Ne-

cessity, who dispatched with each of them the Destiny he had selected to guard his life and satisfy his choice. Thus Destiny first led the soul to Clotho in such a way as to pass beneath her hand and the whirling motion of the distaff, and so ratified the fate which each had chosen in the order of precedence. After touching her, Destiny next led the soul to the spinning of Atropos, and thus rendered the mandate of Clotho irreversible. From thence the souls passed straightforward under the throne of Necessity. When the rest had passed under it, Er himself also passed under; and they all traveled into the Plain of Forgetfulness, through fierce and suffocating heat. As the evening came on they took their quarters by the bank of the River of Indifference, whose waters cannot be held in any vessel. All are compelled to drink a certain quantity of the water; but those who are not guided by prudence drink more than the quantity insisted upon; and each, as he drinks, forgets everything. When they had gone to rest, and it had become midnight, there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake; and in a moment the souls were carried to their new birth, this way and that, like shooting stars.

Er himself was prevented from drinking of the water; but how, and by what road, he reached his body again, he knew not; only he knew that suddenly he opened his eyes at dawn, and found himself laid out upon the funeral pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale was preserved; and it may also preserve us, if we will listen to its warnings; in which case we shall pass safely across the River of Lethe, and not defile our souls. Indeed, if we follow my advice, believing the soul to be immortal, and to pos-

sess the power of entertaining all evil, as well as all good, we shall ever hold fast the upward road, and devotedly cultivate justice combined with wisdom, in order that we may be loved by one another, and by the gods, not only during our stay on earth, but also when, like conquerors in the games collecting the prizes of their admirers, we receive the prizes of virtue; and, in order that both in this life and during the journey of a thousand years, our souls may never cease to prosper.

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